# What safety is

We don't like things getting taken from us, especially when we need them to fulfill a [purpose](purpose.md). In fact, we dislike things taken from us proportionally to how much we [imagine](imagination.md) that thing will fulfill present *and* [perceived purposes](power.md).

We naturally purpose ourselves to [protecting what we have](safety-security.md), but it's not an even distribution. We have limited resources, so we give priority to what we [love](people-love.md) and the [power](power.md) that can protect our things the most.

When we have safety right now, and don't have [predictions](imagination.md) that it'll change in the future, we have "peace".

APPLICATION: Money is a major source of safety, simply because it's effective at solving most problems.

## Risk

Risk can most accurately be rephrased as "the [likelihood](imagination.md) that we could lose [power](power.md)". [Risks are inherent](trust.md) to existing in this life, so people become more careful and decisive as they gain [wisdom](understanding.md). With experience, people only act when they're [certain](understanding-certainty.md).

We usually have a [fear](mind-feelings-fear.md) of something specific, but it's rarely [rational](logic.md) or [likely](math.md) (especially with [past trauma](hardship-ptsd.md)), so we'll simply [feel](mind-feelings.md) vaguely uneasy. Even when we use [statistics](math.md) or behave to force an ultimatum, we're only making our feelings more [certain](understanding-certainty.md) with fact-based possibilities.

The entire point of *any* security/safety system is from vague [trust](trust.md) issues against possible risks:

- Walls, fortresses, and blockades
- Locks on doors and switches
- Passwords/encryption
- Antibiotics
- Guard rails and barriers

The more [fear](mind-feelings-fear.md) we have of losing something, the harder we'll [work](results.md) to keep it. In that sense, you can see how much people [love](people-love.md) things by where they devote their [budget](money-3_budget.md) and other [forms of power](power-types.md).

One easy way to avoid financial risk is to get [insurance](money-insurance.md). By giving up some power in the [form of money](power-types.md), someone can have a [separate organization](groups-large.md) take the risk instead. It's basically paying rent for someone else to take the risk.

Generally, when [deciding](people-decisions.md) when you don't know what to [expect](imagination.md), the safest solution is to apply "minimax regret" (minimize the maximum regret you can experience). In other words, make the worst-case scenario as good as possible.

## The image of safety

We feel "home" wherever we feel safest, which comes from several connected elements working together:

1. Application: we regularly have a [purpose](purpose.md) for visiting that location.
2. Reliability: the location (or something we have) is familiar.
3. Safety: the place is free of [conflict](people-conflicts.md).
4. Emotion: we have good [feelings](mind-feelings.md) associated with that location.

Most people don't separate the concept, but *appearing* secure is different from *being* secure. The [image](people-image-why.md) of security can imply more [power](power.md) than reality, which is why people use "security theater":

- Security guards make their rounds to look more intimidating to potential thieves and vandals, even though a hidden camera with a motion sensor does a better job.
- Thoroughly searching everyone who gets on an airplane will ensure nobody brings a bomb, but random searches (theoretically) [scare](mind-feelings-fear.md) bombers just as much.

APPLICATION: Legitimate security and the [appearance](people-image-why.md) of security are completely unrelated, so don't assume the appearance is [reality](reality.md), especially with [leaders](groups-large.md).

Thieves and vandals are interested in things they can use to gain [some type of power](power-types.md), so another tactic is for defenders to hide their [power](power.md):

- Placing valuable objects in mundane storage spaces.
- Hiding valuable items inside inconspicuous objects.
- Putting important computer files in unimportant folders.

Finally, some [creative](mind-creativity.md) defenders will try to make the intruder waste their time on something unimportant:

- Place rocks in a safe and hide the valuables.
- Have security guards surround a building with nothing significant inside.

The only way to avoid a security breach entirely is to hide the appearance of *anything* valuable, but it requires tremendous [work](results.md) and [creativity](mind-creativity.md) to pull it off correctly:

- Make a fortress look like the surrounding landscape.
- Name an area something inconspicuous.
- Veil the presence of the thing with other elements that are far less threatening or high-profile.

## Safety's risks

The trouble with safety is that we can put too much effort into it. Taken far enough, safety can stifle healthy changes that may have otherwise led to a [meaningful](meaning.md) experience or [good life](goodlife.md).

One specific example of this phenomenon comes through safety equipment. Designers of the equipment are often looking to protect the anatomy of the individuals using it, but often fail to recognize how people will change their behavior in light of those changes.

- Adding plastic padding and protective shells to sports equipment (as opposed to leather-based gear) has made those sports *much* more dangerous (e.g., boxing, American football) through the participants using the additional shielding as an offensive opportunity.
- Increasing the reliability and stopping power of body armor has created increasingly dangerous hollow point bullets that go through them, making modern warfare dramatically more lethal than it has ever been before.

The answer is to foster an [attitude](understanding.md) of safety in the users, but that would require training more [maturity](maturity.md) into people, so [it won't happen](https://theologos.site/unnatural-law/).